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ABSTRACT
Some luck egalitarians argue that justice is just one value among others and is thus 
not necessarily what we should strive for in order to make the world better. Yet, by 
focusing on only one dimension of what matters – luck equality – it proves very 
difficult to draw political implications in cases where several values are in tension. 
We believe that normative political philosophy must have the ambition to guide 
political action. Hence, in this paper we make a negative and a positive point. 
Negatively, we argue that the inability to offer recommendations on what to strive 
for potentially weakens Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s account of luck egalitarianism. 
In order not to be irrelevant for political practice, a more serviceable version of luck 
egalitarianism that would allow for all-things-considered judgments is needed. 
Positively, we examine two possible routes toward such a view. One would be to 
stick to pluralism, but to discuss possible clashes and find a rule of regulation in 
each case. Another would consist in giving up value pluralism by identifying an 
over-arching value or principle that would arbitrate between different values. We 
suggest that Lippert-Rasmussen’s foundation of equality carries the potential for 
such an overarching principle.
KEYWORDS value pluralism; luck egalitarianism; equality; justice; political action
Introduction
Normative political philosophy must have the ambition, in one way or another, 
to guide political action. Theories of justice, in particular, generally present them-
selves as a utopian agenda defining the horizon of the quest for social justice. 
This ambition can be threatened by certain appeals to value pluralism – the view 
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that there is a plurality of values which inevitably conflict in a way that cannot 
be arbitrated once and for all by the political philosopher. Faced with conflicting 
values, some philosophers claim that final decisions have to be made in practice 
and philosophy is confined to the modest role of clarifying important values.
Isaiah Berlin is probably the most famous defender of such value pluralism 
and there now exists a vast literature on the alleged clash between equality 
and freedom, which he took to be insuperable. John Rawls proposed one of the 
most elegant answers to this challenge through his lexicographically ordered 
principles of justice. His difference principle also offers a nice way of articulating 
the values of fairness and efficiency. Because his principles of justice incorporate 
efficiency considerations, he can affirm at the beginning of his Theory of Justice 
that ‘laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be 
reformed or abolished if they are unjust’ because justice is ‘the first virtue of 
social institutions’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 3).
Luck egalitarians reject the Rawlsian approach for a variety of reasons and 
defend a potentially more egalitarian view of justice, which accepts only those 
inequalities that can be traced back to (genuine) choices.1 Yet some of them 
remain silent on how the equality they defend relates to other values such as 
freedom, efficiency or respect. This is the case, for example, with G. A. Cohen, 
who carefully distinguishes judgments about justice from all-things-considered 
judgments. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen seems to endorse a relatively similar 
approach to luck egalitarianism. Fortunately, he devotes the last chapter of 
his book to the relation between luck egalitarian equality and other values. We 
argue, however, that the answer he provides is unsatisfying and fails to live up to 
the ambition that Lippert-Rasmussen sets himself at the beginning of his book, 
i.e. showing why, despite many criticisms, ‘luck egalitarianism remains a strong 
candidate for a plausible theory of distributive justice’ (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2015, 
pp. xiv, xv). The reason is that in order not to be irrelevant for political practice, 
which we believe to be crucial for a plausible theory of justice, such a theory 
must provide guidance to all-things-considered judgments. Yet, on most issues, 
it seems to us that Lippert-Rasmussen’s luck egalitarianism does not.
The section ‘Luck egalitarianism and value pluralism’ considers the relation 
between luck egalitarianism and other values in the works of Cohen and Lippert-
Rasmussen and the rationale behind the isolation of equality from other values. 
It argues that this move has a valuable critical potential but threatens luck egal-
itarianism with practical irrelevance. In ‘What is the point of luck egalitarianism?’ 
we critically assess the defensive strategy endorsed by Lippert-Rasmussen when 
faced with this objection of irrelevance, which consists in downplaying the role 
of a theory of justice. In ‘Pluralism with rules of regulation’ we suggest that one 
can stick to pluralism and yet remain action-guiding by proposing a rule of reg-
ulation for each serious clash of values. Finally, in ‘Valuable for what?’ we explore 
a way of building all-things-considered judgments on an overarching value. In 
this way, we aim at providing an internal critique of luck egalitarianism – whose 
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intuition of justice is here assumed to be valid – and a constructive critique, by 
suggesting two routes open to luck egalitarianism to regain relevance.
Luck egalitarianism and value pluralism
Value pluralism is not endorsed by all luck egalitarians. Yet it grounds one of its 
most famous versions: the one defended by G. A. Cohen.2 Cohen believes that 
inequalities that cannot be traced back to different choices are pro tanto unjust. 
Nonetheless, he warns, this does not entail ‘that such unjust inequality cannot 
be part of a package of policy that is, all-things-considered, superior to any 
other (because values other than justice weigh in its favor)’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 7).
Apart from the last chapter called ‘Other Values’, Lippert-Rasmussen also dis-
cusses value pluralism when facing the so-called leveling down objection to (luck) 
egalitarianism (pp.  129–150). This objection suggests that equality is not by 
itself an attractive ideal as it would entail that we should seek to make everyone 
equal even when this means making everyone worse off than they currently are. 
After having examined several egalitarian responses to this objection, Lippert-
Rasmussen adopts what he coins as the egalitarian ‘bullish stance’: ‘a state in 
which everyone is worse off, but equally well-off, is in one respect – though not 
all-things-considered – better than one in which everyone is better off, though 
unequally so’ (p. 149). This response is only available to those who accept value 
pluralism, or at least doubt the plausibility of a unified theory of value, because 
it assumes we can talk about goodness in reference to only one value among 
many. Monists would say that this state of affairs has to be either desirable or 
undesirable, better or worse, because they take value judgments to be about 
what is, taking on board different considerations, required all-things-considered. 
For example, someone who defends human flourishing as the overarching value 
will surely believe that a state in which everyone flourishes is more desirable 
than one in which less people do, whatever the loss of equality.
What value pluralists want to make room for is the distinction, in Cohen 
(2008)’s words, between fundamental principles of justice on the one hand, 
which are independent from facts and, on the other hand, rules of regulation 
which are facts-sensitive and weigh the value of justice against other values 
to produce an all-things-considered judgment. This distinction, which Lippert-
Rasmussen endorses, allows disentangling considerations of justice from other 
considerations such as efficiency or stability. Its appeal lies in the ability to rescue 
the value of justice from factual assumptions and approaches of justice (con-
structivism is Cohen’s main target) that tend to alter it, or to mix it with other 
considerations at the cost of intellectual clarity.
Why is it important to distinguish justice from all-things-considered judg-
ments? Think about the difference principle, which legitimizes inequalities 
insofar as they provide incentives for production and investment that end 
up benefiting the worst-off. As a result of it, there is no injustice in the fact 
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that talented people claim and receive superior rewards for their contribution. 
Although incentivizing work (and investment) could be considered an appro-
priate rule of regulation, presenting it as a principle of justice may deprive us 
from an important critical tool. A conception of justice which does not allow us 
to criticize the talented for not providing a voluntary effort might be considered 
as insufficiently critical, or even conservative in the sense that it reinforces traits 
of character such as selfishness which could be the mere product of historical 
circumstances (Cohen, 2000, pp. 119, 120).
Now, the weakness of an approach isolating considerations of justice from 
all-things-considered judgments is that much of its practical relevance may be 
lost if no guidance is offered to make all-things-considered judgments, if after 
having defended the justice of equality one merely suggests that ‘it might [none-
theless] be bad policy to level down’ (Cohen, 2008, pp. 319, 320). Political phi-
losophers often set themselves the mission to guide (political) action, although 
the impact of ideas may be low and slow. Cohen would certainly recognize 
this practical ambition of political philosophy, as his philosophical work has 
clearly been moved by a normative agenda. He spent time rebutting the prin-
ciple of self-ownership because he thought it was implicit ‘in the vernacular 
thought-complex which has helped to power the rightward political shift of the 
past quarter-century’ (Cohen, 1996). He worried about the difference principle 
because its rationale was and still is widely used in public debates to oppose 
increases in taxes or justify talent-favoring inequalities. Nevertheless, in his later 
work on the nature of justice, he seems to have popularized a trend in politi-
cal philosophy that distances itself from political practice and considers purely 
theoretical issues such as the fundamental value of justice taken in isolation. 
These theoretical issues are not necessarily devoid from practical implications, 
but these implications could and should be worked out.
Value pluralism combined with a lack of commitment to a principled way to 
adjudicate in case of a clash of different values and a very narrow conception of 
justice make it difficult (and sometimes impossible) for luck egalitarian theories 
of this stripe to guide action when values clash. Although, presumably, luck 
egalitarians think equality is an important value (why would one, otherwise, 
devote one’s theory of justice to it?), without a view on how equality relates 
to other values it is unclear what role equality (or any other value) should play 
when considering what we ought to do all things considered. But what is the 
point of a theory of justice if it cannot guide (political) action? Is it enough to 
consider what justice requires as an isolated value? Granted, Rawls’s approach 
may make too many concessions when formulating requirements of justice, 
but at least it is useful as a tool for the political quest of justice. Rescuing justice 
from more value-encompassing principles, like the ones endorsed by Rawls, will 
not attract many supporters if luck egalitarianism is not, in turn, rescued from 
practical irrelevance.3
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What is the point of luck egalitarianism?
Lippert-Rasmussen faces this challenge of practical irrelevance by assigning the-
ory a modest role in the larger attempt to build all-things-considered judgments 
about political regulation. For an all-things-considered judgment, weighing all 
values appropriately, you need to take a closer look at each particular value first. 
This is what luck egalitarians do with the value of justice. Admittedly, this way 
of proceeding is perfectly legitimate. Rather than considering the theories put 
forth by Lippert-Rasmussen and Cohen as practically irrelevant, we should thus 
consider them as incomplete (p. 3). There is some practical use in studying one 
particular value in detail. It allows us to see what is at stake in the value, what 
kind of appeals to it can be justified and when a clash with another value turns 
out to be merely apparent after the value is properly spelled out. It may very well 
be that if we spell out different values properly, clashes are much rarer than is 
sometimes assumed, as Lippert-Rasmussen argues with regard to community, 
freedom and (despite its dubious status as a value) stability.
Nevertheless, we want to resist the temptation to hide one’s normative com-
mitments behind value pluralism. Lippert-Rasmussen says that ‘weighing differ-
ent values against one another is difficult’ (p. 210) and that he prefers ‘not say 
anything about how much weight exactly should be given to luck egalitarian 
justice’ (p. 210). Being sympathetic to luck egalitarian considerations, however, 
we would like its relevance and appeal to be more apparent. Downplaying the 
role of a theory of justice, it seems to us, will not reconcile luck egalitarianism 
with its discontents. In our view, it is not enough for the plausibility of a theory 
of justice to be consistent. It must also have some political potential.4 Otherwise, 
there is something gratuitous in it – which Lippert-Rasmussen recognizes and 
does not seem to find problematic. And although this ‘gratuity’ is intellectually 
legitimate (not all scientific work needs to have immediate practical relevance), it 
stands in tension with what draws many to political philosophy: the importance 
of social progress in the real world.
Fortunately, Lippert-Rasmussen provides us with some indications on the 
way toward all-things-considered judgments. His last chapter discusses several 
alleged clashes between luck egalitarian justice and other values and convinc-
ingly concludes that it ‘does not clash with freedom, demandingness, publicity 
or stability, though it might do so with certain forms of community’ (p. 239). 
This discussion is useful. What is lacking is a stance on what we should do when 
there is a genuine clash, such as between equality and efficiency or equality 
and respect – the two conflicts that will be discussed in this paper. We shall 
explore two routes open to luck egalitarianism to guide political judgments. 
One route would be to stick to pluralism, but to discuss genuine clashes of 
value and find a satisfying rule of regulation in each case (Section ‘Pluralism 
with rules of regulation’). Another would consist in giving up value pluralism 
of the kind that rules out principled adjudication, by identifying an overarching 
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value or principle that would arbitrate between clashing values. We suggest that 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s foundation of equality potentially entails such a principle 
(Section ‘Valuable for what?’).
Pluralism with rules of regulation
If we cannot find any elegant way of ranking values once and for all – which this 
section takes for granted but the next one challenges – it is important to think 
about ways of arbitrating genuine clashes.5 The clash between equality and 
efficiency is often seen as the most serious. Let us understand efficiency here 
in the restricted sense of productive efficiency, i.e. the capacity of an economic 
organization to boost production so as to increase aggregate wealth. Equal 
incomes are generally believed to be inefficient in this sense because they do 
not incentivize hard work, innovation and investment. Rawls’s defense of the 
difference principle, but also, for example, Richard Arneson’s move away from 
luck egalitarianism and his endorsement of a form of responsibility-catering 
prioritarianism (Arneson, 2000, p. 344) are attempts to deal with this tension. The 
appeal of these approaches is that they escape the leveling-down objection by 
incorporating a form of efficiency within their conception of justice. By doing so, 
though, they blur the distinction between a distributive consideration (fairness 
in the distribution of wealth) and an aggregative one (total amount of wealth of 
the least or less well off).6 Luck egalitarians, in contrast, insist on the distinction. 
Yet they generally deny that egalitarian justice always trumps efficiency.
On the articulation between equality and efficiency, Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
discussion of the leveling down objection to egalitarianism is disappointing. 
He seems to believe that we should never level down and limits his discussion 
to exploring some ways in which egalitarians have struggled to counter this 
objection. What the reader keeps wondering is for what reasons, and under 
what circumstances, efficiency considerations might trump requirements of 
luck egalitarian justice. Should we always sacrifice equality for the benefit of the 
worst-off? Should we sacrifice efficiency when the worst-off cannot be benefited 
but others (not necessarily much better off) can (Parfit, 1997)?
One line of argument could be the following. Imagine people deciding rules 
of regulation under ideal conditions of discussion. In order to avoid the bias 
toward wealth maximization of the Rawlsian original position, where people 
are supposed to maximize their gains, imagine people discussing freely on the 
appropriate balance between equality and efficiency. People rightly value effi-
ciency in production because they want to reduce their amount of toil and 
spend time doing other things than working. Productivity can be increased by 
sacrificing some equality. Provided that even those who become relatively worse 
off due to this deviation from equality value efficiency over justice, this move is 
legitimate. Yet at some point a society reaches a threshold of wealth and pro-
ductivity that makes an important reduction of labor technically possible that 
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would not make everyone worse off. It then becomes dubious that efficiency 
gains necessarily ‘benefit’ the least well off more than preserving the level of 
equality. If people do not merely value economic benefits (e.g. increased pur-
chasing power) and their absolute position, but also luck egalitarian justice and 
their relative position, a steady-state economy with limited inequality is likely 
to be preferable to continued growth and deepening inequality – assuming, 
for simplicity’s sake, that growth effectively benefits the less well off from a 
material point of view, which is far from evident in reality. From such a perspec-
tive, efficiency would trump equality only up to the point that some sufficiency 
threshold (to partly free people from toil) is reached. At that point, equality and 
efficiency would be in equilibrium: you cannot sacrifice some more equality for 
more efficiency and you cannot increase equality if it threatens the steady state.
Most people probably value both equality and wealth, but some Rawlsians 
and prioritarians might go too far when supposing that an increase of the wealth 
of the least well off or those among the less well off is always preferable to 
an increase of equality.7 Pareto improvements may be rational and legitimate 
from a democratic point of view, but they are not necessarily just, and could 
be resisted in the name of justice. Whether people will actually prefer justice to 
efficiency is another question, as they will often be tempted by a bigger share 
and have been socialized in societies giving primacy to work and consumption 
over leisure. Yet the point of this brief discussion is only to show that there are 
many ways of balancing justice and efficiency, and how to do so is the pressing 
question that egalitarians face in the real world.
It would be interesting to have Lippert-Rasmussen’s views on such concrete 
issues. Alternatively, if he does not want to go into the details, he could select a 
general rule of regulation among the following: either, efficiency always trumps 
justice when it benefits the worst-off, or when it benefits other people without 
harming the worst-off, or only to a certain point – say a sufficiency threshold 
(Casal, 2007). This would clarify where the conception of luck egalitarianism 
endorsed by Lippert-Rasmussen stands compared to competing theories of 
justice. You could have different types of luck egalitarians: some more Rawlsian 
– because they accept the difference principle as a rule of regulation – some 
more Arnesonian – because they include more aggregative considerations in 
their rule of regulation – etc. Luck egalitarianism would become a partial stance 
on the question of justice, to be supplemented with rules of regulation.
Respect is another value which is often taken to clash with fairness but it is 
not explicitly discussed by Lippert-Rasmussen. Wolff (1998) has argued that this 
other egalitarian value – respect – might trump fairness if enforcing fairness 
would be too costly in terms of it. This is the case, he argues, with most policies to 
distinguish between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor. Yet does respect 
for people’s dignity, or concern for their self-respect always trump considerations 
of fairness?8 Other people argue that it is disrespectful not to treat people with 
normal mental capacities as autonomous and capable of responsible choices 
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(see Dworkin, 2000, 2011). But as Cohen and Lippert-Rasmussen suggest, if ine-
qualities cannot be traced back to genuine free choices, they are unjust. Now, in 
the absence of certainty about free will,9 what should be our rule of regulation? 
Should we be ready to sacrifice fairness for respect? Respect for fairness? Should 
we again opt for a sufficiency threshold?
An interesting rule of regulation, articulating fairness, respect and efficiency, 
would be the following. As a matter of fairness, the state should try to ‘level the 
playing field’ and equalize opportunities for welfare (or, in Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
words, to equalize ‘the satisfaction of individual’s reasonable non-instrumental 
concerns’) by equalizing hourly wage and job opportunities and by providing 
free services for accommodating different needs. As a matter of respect and 
efficiency, it nonetheless holds individuals responsible for part of their situa-
tion (the trade-off they opt for between work and leisure). This is respectful, in 
Dworkin’s sense, because assuming full determinism hurts people’s self-respect 
and self-understanding of their actions (Dworkin, 2011, ch. 9). And it is efficient 
because it incentivizes work. Yet, in addition, a limit is set to the satisfaction of 
these two values: as a matter of justice, no one should fall below a sufficiency 
threshold covering basic needs. This can be secured via an unconditional income 
guarantee, which then also makes the policy respectful in Wolff’s sense because 
people do not have to make shameful revelations to access income support. 
This proposal offers a clearer view of how the equalizing impulse is limited by 
other values and how it itself constrains the pursuit of these values. By clarify-
ing their views on such issues, luck egalitarians might be even better placed to 
tackle objections based on luck egalitarianism’s alleged practical implications 
– in particular objections from relational egalitarians.
In sum, recognizing a plurality of values does not commit anyone to value rel-
ativism10 or to intellectual retreat in the world of pure ideas. If Lippert-Rasmussen 
is not ready to abandon value pluralism, he could nonetheless come forth with 
a more complete and more appealing theory. Yet the next section challenges 
the very idea of value pluralism, the abandonment of which is obviously another 
possible strategy.
Valuable for what?
In this section, we develop another strategy to make Lippert-Rasmussen’s ver-
sion of luck egalitarianism capable of guiding action. Although he explicitly 
rejects the idea that all values have to be deducible from one source-value (pp. 
10, 52, 53), we want to suggest that his view might contain the tools to offer a 
principled way to adjudicate in cases where values conflict.
The key for this strategy lies in chapter 2 (‘Why Equality?’). In this chap-
ter, Lippert-Rasmussen discusses a fundamental question of moral philoso-
phy: by virtue of what are people moral equals? He offers what we call the 
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grounding claim, which we argue seems to commit him to a strong position on 
all-things-considered judgments:
The grounding claim: ‘the equality of moral standing of persons is grounded in their 
capacity to be non-instrumentally concerned with things in a distinctive way, say, 
one that involves long-term planning’. (p. 51)
Non-instrumentally caring for something means that one cares for it not as 
a means to an end, but that one judges the thing important for its own sake. 
An example of something we non-instrumentally care for is our own welfare. 
We may also non-instrumentally care for the welfare of others, for the natu-
ral environment or for things of great beauty like works of art (p. 99).11 This 
answer to why equality? grounds Lippert-Rasmussen’s stance on the currency 
of egalitarian justice debate. People should be equal in terms of ‘what they are 
non-instrumentally concerned about’ (p. 51) – and, an important addition, ‘not 
unreasonably so’ (p. 112).12
Why should people with equal moral standing have equal amounts of what 
they non-instrumentally care about? Lippert-Rasmussen thinks that fairness 
does the work here: ‘treating people with equal moral standing unequally 
when there is no difference between them that can justify the relevant differ-
ential treatment is plainly unfair’ (p. 52). We share the intuition that there are 
strong pro tanto fairness-based reasons to treat moral equals equally. However, 
as Lippert-Rasmussen admits, it is highly implausible to claim that equality (or 
fairness) is the only thing of value, or perhaps even the only justice-related value 
(p. 209), and although value conflicts with equality in the luck egalitarian sense 
are perhaps less frequent than is sometimes assumed, clashes with other values 
may be inevitable. Possible justification for unequal treatment, then, cannot be 
ruled out.
Lippert-Rasmussen’s ground for equal moral treatment might nonetheless 
contain, in nuce, a way to adjudicate between different values in case of a genu-
ine clash. If one takes a certain capacity as the foundation for moral equality, this 
(it seems to us) has to be connected to a very deep appreciation of this capacity. 
Presumably, this is because Lippert-Rasmussen thinks that it is of great moral 
importance to have the capacity to non-instrumentally care about things (from 
now on: the capacity). Lippert-Rasmussen writes (regarding the implications of 
his answer to the question why equality? to the equality of what? question): ‘if we 
think the basis of equal moral standing is the capacity to experience pain and 
pleasure, it would be odd to think that causing pain or pleasure are irrelevant to 
the wrong- or right-making features’ (p. 51). We suggest a variant of this claim 
holds true for his view: if, like Lippert-Rasmussen, we think that the capacity to 
non-instrumentally care about things grounds moral equality, it would be odd 
to claim that the extent to which this capacity is protected and can be put to 
good use is irrelevant to wrong-making features.
One may object that not moral equality but fairness is the reason an equal 
distribution is required.13 Yet, although Lippert-Rasmussen claims that fairness 
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is independently grounded (or not grounded at all), there is an important sense 
in which his grounding claim generates fairness concerns.14 It is, after all, only 
among moral equals that fairness applies. As we will argue, a commitment to 
the grounding claim does not give rise exclusively to fairness considerations. 
There are three different ways15 in which equal treatment could be in tension 
with the grounding claim: equal treatment can undermine the capacity; equal 
treatment can undermine the use of the capacity; and, finally, equal treatment 
could undermine the extent to which people realize the goals the capacity allows 
them to set. To illustrate the difference, let us take people’s plans in life as an 
example of something they non-instrumentally care about. People need the 
agency-conditions necessary to formulate plans, they need an environment 
in which they can use these capacities to formulate plans, and – finally – they 
need the means to pursue the plans they have made. Let us discuss each in turn.
First, one may be concerned with the protection of this capacity itself. 
Certainly, moral equals are entitled to the protection of their status as full mem-
bers of the moral community. Yet, it is unclear that equality is always the best 
way to do so. Imagine two alternatives: a world where all are equally well off at 
very low levels (some die because their basic needs are not met) or a slightly 
unequal world where everybody is much better off. Having one’s basic needs 
met is a necessary precondition for having the capacity in the first place.16 An 
attachment to this capacity, then, in some cases overrules equality. It seems 
that in this case equality undermines what makes it valuable in the first place: 
equality at very low levels may undermine people’s capacity to be non-instru-
mentally concerned with things. Pursuing fairness at this cost, in this particular 
case, goes against the spirit of what makes people moral equals and hence 
against what made that fairness was required in the first place. This cannot be 
right: equality should not be protected at the cost of what makes people eligible 
for equal treatment.17
Second, there is the ability to use the capacity. What is having this capacity 
good for, if one cannot use the capacity? The leveling down objection can be 
used to show why this is so. In cases of great deprivation, people may not be 
able to care for things in a non-instrumental way, at least not one that involves 
long term planning. If one is very poor, one may be constantly occupied with 
issues of survival. If one does not enjoy freedom of expression or freedom of con-
science, one cannot formulate long term plans in life one reflectively endorses. 
The ‘bullish stance’ that Lippert-Rasmussen seems to take on the leveling down 
objection may be compatible with his view of justice (perhaps the poor world 
is ‘in one way’ better), but given his preferred basis for moral equality, it seems 
that it is morally (much) worse. Again, the tension is between equality and the 
grounding claim: an equal distribution may go against people using the capacity 
that makes them moral equals. Other principles may be better placed to protect 
the effective use of the capacity, like sufficiency or efficiency. One could argue 
that sufficiency trumps equality in this case, by pointing to how prioritizing one 
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over the other relates to the capacity: sometimes sufficiency will be the best 
way to ensure that what makes equality valuable is protected. It is important to 
point out, however, that this reply does not rule out leveling down categorically: 
there may be situations in which everybody is quite well off and where a move 
to equality would not clash with the capacity.
Finally, it seems that by endorsing the grounding claim, one will have to worry 
about people’s ability to realize or pursue the things that they non-instrumentally 
care for, say their long-term plans. Lippert-Rasmussen seems to be concerned 
with people actually attaining what they non-instrumentally care for. Placing 
people in a position where they can form attachment to certain things for their 
own sake seems inconsistent if one, afterwards, is not concerned with people’s 
capacity to actually (try to – if one is an opportunity-egalitarian) attain or realize 
whatever it is they non-instrumentally care for. Lippert-Rasmussen is certainly 
concerned with people realizing their plans, but focuses on people’s capacity to 
equally realize their plans. But, as Christiano and Braynen (2008) have pointed 
out as well,18 if one cares about the equal distribution of a thing, one has to think 
the thing itself is valuable as well. In this case, the thing (Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
answer to the metric question) is success in attaining what we non-instrumen-
tally care about. However, several other values than distributive equality may 
matter when thinking about people’s capacity to realize their plans. Relational 
equality19 may be one. Lippert-Rasmussen’s willingness to take satisfaction of 
offensive (pp. 89–91) preferences into consideration may be particularly prob-
lematic in this regard, because this allows for preferences denying each other a 
status as equals to count when realizing equality.20 Including racist, misogynist, 
or otherwise in-egalitarian preferences as if they were legitimate might have 
several detrimental effects, for example on people’s bases of self-respect and 
the sense that their plans matter as much as others’.
But not only relational equality, which Lippert-Rasmussen argues can be 
accommodated within luck egalitarianism, should worry us here. Efficiency wor-
ries arise as well. Only some types of goods need to be equally distributed in 
order for people to realize the plans they non-instrumentally care for. In other 
cases, and with other goods at stake, a larger set of goods may be better even if 
this set of goods is smaller than that of others. It is unclear why a situation that 
is less conducive to people realizing what they non-instrumentally care for could 
be better because everybody is equally badly placed to realize their respective 
plans. Note that our appeal here is not simply an appeal to the leveling down 
objection, but we rather point to a tension in accepting both leveling down as 
required by justice and the ground for moral equality. In other words, there is 
a tension between what is required by justice and what makes it required by 
justice. At the very least, this ground for equality commits a luck egalitarian to 
saying that a world in which everybody is equally badly off (everybody fails to 
see the things they non-instrumentally care for materialize) is worse than a world 
in which everybody is equally well off but sees their plans of life fulfilled. One 
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may reasonably claim that institutions that treat people as moral equals (realiz-
ing relational equality) and allow for certain inequalities are more conducive to 
people attaining what they non-instrumentally care for. Again, if strict equality 
leads to a situation where people are less well placed to put the capacity to good 
use, this is inconsistent with the grounding claim.
Besides the three ways in which a concern for the capacity tells us something 
about how conflicts between values should be dealt with, it gives us priority 
rules as well. Not priority rules that rank different values over each other (say, 
freedom always trumps equality), but a lexicographic ranking, by looking at the 
importance of what the different values at work are protecting. The precondi-
tions for the capacity have to be protected first and foremost. Without it, the 
other two (using and acting on the results) are impossible to begin with. Using 
the capacity – making long-term plans – is more important than the capacity to 
realize the plans, since one cannot realize plans one did not make. This priority 
does not have to be a strict one. Once people have their capacity to make plans 
well protected, they may benefit more from increasing the amounts of goods 
to pursue their plans than from a stronger protection of basic rights. The kind 
of priority order proposed here avoids the implausible claim that one particular 
value always takes priority over all other values. When confronted with value 
conflicts, we should not only look at the value at stake, but also at what we are 
protecting by protecting the value.
As we have tried to show, equality is not the only value that has a clear con-
nection with the fundamental capacity and, sometimes, it cannot – given the 
grounding claim – be the most important one. In certain circumstances, and 
when certain goods are at stake, equality is the best way to protect this particular 
capacity. This is arguably true for political power or equal treatment under the 
law. But in other circumstances, or for other goods, other values may be more 
important for the protection of people’s capacity to non-instrumentally care 
for things, to use the capacity, and to realize the plans that result from the use 
of the capacity. If this is right, we need a plausible interpretation of what this 
capacity consists in exactly, and what is needed to protect, use, and pursue it.
One could treat this proposal in two ways. First, one could try to construct 
some kind of Lippert-Rasmussian foundationalism: treating the capacity to 
non-instrumentally care for things as the ground from which all other values 
flow. Something, on such a view, would only be valuable if – and in so far as – it 
protects the capacity. A reductive view like this, finding a common ground for all 
values, is an option that Lippert-Rasmussen seems to find unattractive (pp. 52, 
53). He argues that even if it is a legitimate complaint against his view that 
some values are ungrounded, it is a complaint that equally holds for all other 
views. We think that one may be more ambitious here: where other views have 
difficulties with grounding values, Lippert-Rasmussen’s might offer a possible 
ground for a principled approach to clashes of values. Second, if one insists on 
value pluralism, one could treat the capacity as one value among others, but as 
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a very important one – at least important enough to be a reason to treat people 
as moral equals. In balancing what different values require, this could serve as 
an anchor when reaching reflective equilibrium.
We did not aim to show that there is no plurality of incommensurable values 
(the proposal made in this section does not entail monism), and neither does it 
entail a strict (or even loose) lexical ordering of different values. Neither is the 
view proposed here committed to something like Dworkin’s version of holism, 
which would require us to interpret values in such a way that all values are 
compatible (see Dworkin, 2011; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2015, p. 232). Finally, this 
section does neither entail that justice has to be understood as luck egalitarian 
equality, or that justice goes beyond luck egalitarian equality alone. One, for 
reasons not discussed here, might want to retain the powerful concept of justice 
for what we should do all-things-considered for political reasons.21 But for the 
purposes of our argument, one can keep justice as one value which then feeds 
into whatever one needs to do all-things-considered (act in the morally right 
way? Realize ‘Schmustice?’). This way, one can still claim that natural inequalities 
are unjust (rather than merely regrettable). Although we do not necessarily 
agree with Lippert-Rasmussen’s approach to these questions, our arguments in 
this section do not bear on them. We propose that there might be a way to adju-
dicate between different values by appeal to reasons Lippert-Rasmussen himself 
endorses, given that it flows from his preferred ground for moral equality.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed two ways in which luck egalitarianism in general, 
and Lippert-Rasmussen’s version of it specifically, could be made more robust 
against the challenge of practical irrelevance. Because we are sympathetic to 
the main claims of luck egalitarian justice and concerned with its philosophical 
and political appeal, we think that prominent defenders of luck egalitarianism 
should not hide behind value pluralism or behind a purely abstract and narrow 
approach to justice (figuring out the intricacies of one particular concept). More 
importantly, we think luck egalitarians have no convincing reason to do so: they 
have plenty of means at their disposal to think about how to embed equality of 
luck in a wider and more ambitious theory. A defense of luck egalitarianism is 
incomplete, and perhaps even unappealing without this wider view.
In sum, we do not believe that it is impossible to find appropriate rules of reg-
ulation for the few genuine conflicts of value that one may encounter. Of course, 
it requires more normative commitment on difficult issues – and not the least a 
clarification of the policies entailed by luck egalitarianism. But we believe this is 
the main task of political philosophy – and that luck egalitarianism (including 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s version) may be perfectly able to take on this task.
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Notes
1.  This view can be held to be more egalitarian on the assumption that very few 
inequalities can be justified by appeal to choice (see Barry, 2005). Otherwise, as 
luck egalitarianism is more choice-sensitive than the Rawlsian principles, it could 
also be – in one way – more inegalitarian, which is the assumption on which many 
critics from the left base their objection to luck egalitarianism.
2.  Temkin (2000) is another example of such egalitarian value pluralism. He 
concludes his discussion of the leveling down objection to equality by saying 
that the ‘main lesson […] is that we should be pluralists about morality’ (p. 155).
3.  We are not the first to notice this, of course. e.g. Schemmel (2007, p. 63) says: 
‘The luck egalitarian principle is so strong and insensitive to moral complexity 
that its status as a principle of justice is unclear, both for the domestic case and 
for the global case’.
4.  See Axelsen and Bidadanure (in press).
5.  Arbitrating is different from ordering once and for all. It is a matter of regulation 
and the guidelines provided may lack the philosophical foundation of principles 
of justice. Pluralists may reject definitive orderings, but this does not make 
arbitrations impossible. It is just a matter of decision, grounded in various 
considerations, including but not exhausted by justice.
6.  On this distinction, see Barry, 1965, pp. 43, 44.
7.  Rawls himself seems attracted by Mill’s ideal of a steady-state economy (see 
Rawls, 1999, p. 107, fn. 33), so he might not always recommend maximizing the 
prospects of the least well off. Or maybe he thinks that maximizing the prospects 
of the least well off in terms of primary goods requires at some point to sacrifice 
wealth for leisure. Moreover, the amount of inequality compatible with what 
Rawls calls ‘perhaps the most important primary good’ (1971, §67), the social 
bases of self-respect, may also be limited. This is another way in which the amount 
of inequalities permitted by a Rawlsian theory would be constrained.
8.  An alternative way of responding to the challenge, suggested by Wolff himself, 
would be to include respect within the currency of egalitarian justice and thus 
consider the distribution of welfare as a matter of fairness. Hence egalitarian 
policies that hurt people’s self-respect would be precluded by a commitment to 
equalize (opportunities for) welfare (Wolff, 1998). As Lippert-Rasmussen’s metric 
of egalitarian justice includes – yet is not exhausted by – welfare (pp. 98–101), 
this line of argument is available to him. However, it does not make the tension 
disappear; it only becomes an internal tension between two aspects of fairness 
which are the responsibility sensitivity and the equalization of (opportunities 
for) welfare. The appropriate balance must still be found.
9.  Dworkin does not think that the uncertainty about free will should bother 
us because our attribution of responsibility to people does not depend on 
empirical facts. Contrary to Cohen, he defends the compatibilist view that moral 
responsibility is compatible with full determinism. See Dworkin, 2011, ch. 10.
10.  Value pluralism is the mere recognition of a plurality of basic values 
independent from one another. Value relativism is the idea that those values are 
incommensurable.
11.  See Stemplowska (in press) for a discussion of this.
12.  We think the capacity is best understood as a range property. However, within 
the range, people’s capacity to non-instrumentally care for things itself is a scalar 
capacity: people may be closer or further away from the minimal level. Lippert-
Rasmussen’s claim has to be that although people are not equal in having the 
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capacity, as long as they are within the range they are moral equals. Of course, 
this raises questions about the acceptability of taking a range property, which 
supervenes on a scalar property (Carter, 2011). Lippert-Rasmussen discusses 
Carter’s challenge with respect to Rawls’ (1971, § 77) preferred range property 
and criticizes Carter’s proposal for being vulnerable to his own objection (p. 47), 
but he does not discuss how his preferred standard fares in light of this challenge. 
He merely points out that the worries about a luck egalitarian grounding of moral 
equality are no ‘reason to reject egalitarianism, since other distributive theories 
involve similar problems’ (p. 51). Although we do not find this reply very satisfying, 
we lack space to discuss this issue here.
13.  We thank the anonymous reviewers for pressing us to clarify this.
14.  More can be said about the relationship between moral equality and fairness, 
but unfortunately we cannot do so here.
15.  These three levels at which equality may be bad loosely follow Rawls’ distinction 
between the basic needs which need to be covered to protect the fair value of 
basic liberties (Casal, 2007, 323; Rawls, 2005, 228), the first principle which aims 
to protect people’s moral powers (Casal, 2007, 324; Rawls, 2005) and the second 
principle (which aims to distribute those goods people need to pursue their 
plans in life) (Rawls, 1971, 92).
16.  See e.g. Casal, 2007, for why basic needs have priority in a Rawlsian theory of 
justice over the first principle of justice.
17.  This argument is structurally similar to Christiano and Braynen (2008, 398)’s claim 
that those who value equality of something do so because they value that thing. 
Thus they prefer more of that thing to less; otherwise they would not bother with 
its distribution. Hence, wanting equality of that thing entails a refusal to level 
down: even if inequalities are always unjust, some equalities are even more unjust 
than some inequalities when compared with an ideal distribution which is both 
equal and Pareto optimal. Our claim is that if one grounds the moral equality in 
the capacity, one must value the capacity itself. And if one values the capacity 
one does not only value equality in the realization of one’s goals, but one cares 
about the realization of the goals (which sometimes requires equality, sometimes 
something else). We thank an anonymous reviewer for insisting that we clarify 
the similarities and differences between our view and Christiano and Braynen’s.
18.  Note, however, that accepting Christiano and Braynen’s proposal does not 
necessarily entail giving up on pluralism, whereas the approach we suggest 
here does entail that, because it takes the value of the capacity as foundational.
19.  Understood, for example, as being able to relate to your fellow citizens as equals 
(see Anderson, 1999; Axelsen and Bidadanure, in press).
20.  We find Lippert-Rasmussen’s claim that offensive preferences can be included 
surprising, especially given that he thinks we should protect what people care 
about non instrumentally ‘not unreasonably so’. This raises the question what it 
means to have racist, misogynist or otherwise offensive preferences ‘reasonably 
so’.
21.  See Axelsen and Bidadanure (in press).
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